Workplace Codes of Conduct — a Review of Recent Cases by Madhuku, Lovemore

THE ZIMBABWE LAW REVIEW
1997 VOLUME 14
CONTENTS
ARTICLES
Defending and Protecting Gender Equality and the Family Under a Decidedly
Undecided Constitution in Zimbabwe.................................................................................1
W elshman Ncube
Why I Can't Teach Customary Law.........'................... !........ .V..Uh..^.™'.....:........ .......... 18
Julie E. Stewart
Redefining Insider Dealing Law for Emerging Markets: A Comparative Legal 
Study.................................................  29
Kenneth K. Mwenda
Marriage by Affidavit: Developing Alternative Laws on Cohabitation
in K enya................  46
J anet Kabeberi-M achakia and Celestine Nyamu
Exploring Law and Reality: WLSA Methodology: A Zimbabwe Version?...............54
J ulie E. Stewart
Children and Adults' Memory for Faces: Implications for Face Identification 
Procedures in Criminal Investigations............................................................................... 74
Patrick Chiroro, Stabiso Sithole and T inashe Muromo
Much Ado About Nothing: The Intellectual Property Rights Regime in 
Zifnbabwe: The Case for Reform ..........................................................................................87
Dennis T. Mandudzo
Lawyers Against the Law? Judges and the Legal Profession in Rhodesia and 
Zimbabwe..................................................................................................................................108
W elshman Ncube
Banking Law and Public Policy: Recent Developments in Zimbabwean Law .... 126
Lovemore Madhuku
Democratisation of Business: Zimbabwe's Newest Business Entity.......................135
Artwell Gumbo
t
Alteration of the Constitution........................................................................................... 144
Greg Linington
Workplace Codes of Conduct — A Review of Recent Cases.................................... 152
Lovemore Madhuku
Human Rights Training for Public O fficials................................................................. 159
Geoff Feltoe
126 Lovemore Madhuku
BANKING LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY: RECENT 
DEVELOPMENTS IN ZIMBABWEAN LAW
Lovemore Madhuku
Lecturer, Public Law Department, Faculty of Law, University of Zimbabwe
INTRODUCTION
The banker-customer relationship is largely a matter of contract.1 Although there are other 
special contracts which arise in specific transactions,2 the main contract is that of debtor 
and creditor.3! An important question which arises from this contract basis of banking law 
is to what extent is public policy invoked to interfere with the freedom of the parties to 
contract as they wish? Where the banker's customer is a mere ordinary individual, the 
inequality of bargaining power between the two parties is obvious and the temptation to 
resort to public policy to protect the weaker party against unfair contract terms dictated by 
the other appears to be high. However, orthodox contract theory has resisted such inroads 
and its crudeness has been very well captured by Professor Hahlo in the following passage:
Provided a man is not a minor or a lunatic and his consent is not vitiated by fraud, 
mistake or duress, his contractual undertakings will be enforced to the letter. If, through 
inexperience, carelessness or weakness of character, he has allowed himself to be over­
reached, it is just too bad for him, and it can only be hoped that he will learn from his 
experience. The courts will not release him from the contract or make a better bargain 
for him. Darwinian survival of the fittest, the law of nature, is also the law of the 
market place.4
This approach has been defended.5 The chief supporting basis is that the courts are not 
qualified to determine what is fair or unfair in the financial market, further, invoking 
public policy to cut down bargains is said to be a recipe for creating unnecessary 
uncertainties in the law.
This crude approach to contract has not been followed in banking law. Public policy has 
been invoked in banking law to protect the weaker partyj^bfm unfair contract terms, or 
unconscionable bargains and this article seeks to briefly explore the extent to which this 
has been the case. Notwithstanding the already outlined supporting arguments for keeping 
public policy interventions out of the operation of contracts, there are plausible arguments 
to the contrary. First, jmarket forces on their own are not always perfect and public policy
1 Thus Ross Granston States, "contract emerges as the overarching feature of the (banker-customer)
relationship ..." see Principles of Banking Law (1997) p. 138 et seq. See also Paget's Law of Banking (11th 
edition) at p.110 et. seq. «
2 For example, the contract of depository.
3 Foley v Hill (1848) 2H LCase 28; Joachimsonv Swiss Bank Corporation [1921] 3 KB110, R v Bester 1961 (2) 
SA 52 (FSC), S v Keaney 1964 (2) SA 495(A); S v Kotze 1965(1) SA 118 (AD); Standard Bank of SA Ltd v 
Oneanate Investments 1995 (4) SA 510(C); Standard Bank of S.A Ltd v ABSA Bank Ltd & Another 1995(2) 
SA 740 (T).
4 Hahlo 1981 (98) SALJ 70.
5 For a simple summary of this defence, see McKendrik, Contract Law (1977) at p.33. For a detailed 
discussion of this subject, see for instance, M. Trebilcock, The Limits of Freedom of Contract (1993); A 
Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (1994; R. A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 4th 
edition (1992).
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interventions are essential to promote efficiency.6 7Secondly, it is submitted that any legal 
system worth its salt should strike down certain unfair contract terms to promote fairness 
as an end in itself ? It has thus been rightly suggested that legal intervention in contractual 
bargains may be justified for the "preservation of morality in the market system".8 A broad 
concept of fairness should be able to accommodate the striking down of 'immoral' barriers 
behaviour and this is a legitimate function of law.
Apart from the area of contract, banking law also faces public policy considerations in the 
area of the delictual obligations imposed on bankers in relation to both the customer and 
third parties. The following aspects of banking law which have raised issues of the role of 
public policy will be explored in this article: the in duplum rule, (ii) undue influence and 
sureties, (iii) conclusive proof certificates and (iv) the delictual liability of a collecting banker.
THE IN  D U P LU M  RULE
The in dutplum rule was crisply stated by Selikowitz J in Standard Bank ofS.A. Ltd v Oneanate 
Investments (Pty) Ltd9 in the following terms:
The in duplum rule is as it is known in our law provides that interest stops running 
once unpaid interest is equal to the unpaid capital. It follows that a creditor may not 
recover more, in legal proceedings against the debtor, than unpaid capital together 
with interest equal to the unpaid capital.10
The rule further provides that should interest thereafter fall below the unpaid capital, it 
begins to run again until it reaches the unpaid capital.11 The Zimbabwean High Court 
recently confirmed this rule as part of our law in the leading case of Commercial Bank of 
Zimbabwe v MM Builders and Suppliers.12 This is in line with a long line of authorities 
entrenching the rule as part of Roman Dutch law.13
The basis of the in duplum rule is public policy. This much was accepted in Commercial Bank 
o f Zimbabwe v MM Builders & Supplies where Gillespie J stated:
The ancient Roman and Roman-Dutch law applied the duplum rule rigorously, to the 
extent that interest could not accrue after the amount of the double was reached. The 
rulelwas one conceived in public policy and in order to supply protection perceived 
to be necessary.14
6 In addition to the texts referred to in note 5, see also B.R. Cheffins, Company Law: Theory, Structure, 
and Operation (1997), chapter 3..
7 Ibid. Unfairness as a basis for setting aside bargains has been embraced by the Australian courts: see 
for instance Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447.
8 B.R. Cheffins, op cit p.156.
9 1995 (4) SA S10 (C).
10 Atp. 5591-J. #
11 LTA Construction Bpk v Administrateur 1992 (1) SA 473 (A).
12 1996 (2) ZLR 420 (H).
13 Neikerk v Niekerk 1830 1 Menzies 452; Roberts v Booy 1884 (4) EDC 22; Taylor v Hollard (1886) 2 SAR 78/ 
85; Van Diggelen v Triggs 1911 SR 154; Union Government v Jordans Executors 1916 TPD 411; Oosthuizen 
+ Ors v South Africa Railways & Harbours 1928 WLD 52; Van Copenhagen v Van Copenhagen 1947 (1) SA 
576 (T); Administrasie van Transvaal v Oosthuizen en 'n Ander 1990 (3) SA 387 (W); LTA Construction Bpk 
v Administrateur, Transvaal 1992 (U SA 473 (A) Standard BankofSAv Oneanate Investments 1995 (4) SA 
510 (C) Leech & Ors v ABSA Bank Ltd (1997) 3 All SA 380(W); Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v 
Oneanate Investments 1998 (1) SA 811(SCA).
14 At p. 465 F-G.
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Jm Standard Bank o f SA v Oneamte Investments (in Liquidationl15 the South African Supreme 
Court of Appeal put the public policy issue more forcefully in the following words of 
Zulman JA:
The rule is out based on a public policy designed to protect borrowers from exploitation
by lenders.16
The recent extensive discussion of the scope of the rule by Gillespie J in Commercial Bank of 
Zimbabwe v MM Builders & Suppliers does not, it is submitted, adequately address the public 
policy basis of the rule. There are four aspects worth noting from Gillespie J's judgment. 
First, the court had to consider whether the in duplum rule applied to bank overdrafts as 
distinct from other loan accounts. It had been argued on behalf of the bank that the rule 
did not apply to an overdrawn account because interest debited on such an account was 
itself a loan by the bank to the customer. Accordingly, it was argued, there was essentially 
no interest on an overdraft to which the rule could apply. An acceptance of this argument 
would have ousted the in duplum rule from overdrafts, thus substantially reducing its public 
policy value given that it would have failed to protect the banker's customer in one of the 
commonest relationships between a bank and its customer. The argument was rightly 
rejected, although it is somewhat disappointing that the court did not spell out a clear 
conceptual basis for the rejection. The conceptual basis is that whether an amount is capital 
or interest is a question of law and not a matter of accounting gymnastics. An overdraft iiT 
conceptually the lending of money17 and interest is the charge for the use of that money 
regardless of how it is reflected in the books of accounts. The-same conceptual analysis 
applies to the alternative argument put forward by the bank, namely that on capitalisation, 
interest ceases to be interest and becomes capital. The court was therefore correct to reject 
this alternative argument.18 The holding that the in duplum rule applied to overdrafts in the 
same way as it does to other loan accounts enhanced the public policy basis of the rule by 
making it available to a common financial instrument used by_banks.
The same cannot be said in relation to how Gillespie J dealt with the second aspect of the 
mode of appropriation of payments made to an overdrawn account. The judge refused to 
follow the position of Selikowitz J. in Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Oneanate who had applied 
the English la y  rule in Clayton's case.19 According to this latter rule, payments to an 
overdrawn account are appropriated first, to the first debt to be incurred, hence the 
description of the rule as "first incurred, first discharged." Gillespie ] reasoned that Roman- 
Dutch law had its own substantive rule which provided that when a debt produces interest, 
appropriation of payments is to interest first and then to capital.20 Although this approach 
has been supported by the South African Supreme Court of Appeal21 it is submitted that it 
is of doubtful correctness and undermines the public policy value of the in duplum rule. * 
The Clayton's rule is merely a presumption of fact which can easily be reconciled with the
15 1998 (1)SA 811 (SCA).
16 At 828 D-E It endorsed an earlier lower court decision of Leech & Ors v ABSA Bank Ltd [1997] 3 ALL 
SA 308 (W).
17 See Re Hone exp The Trustee v Kensington Borough Council (1951) Cfi 85 at 89, E.P. Ellinger and E 
Lomnicka, Modern Banking Law 2nd ed (1994) p.577.
18 On this aspect, it followed the judgment of Selikowitz J in Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Oneanate Investments 
1995(4) SA510 (C) and affirmed an appeal 1998 (1) SA811 (SCA) at 828-829.
19 Davaynes v Noble Clayton's I Mer 529,35 ER 767.
20 At p 461-463.
21 Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Oneanate Investments 1998(1) SA 811 (SCA) at 831 et. seq.
i
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substantive rule of law relied on by Gillespie). It is submitted that the better view of the 
law is as follows: If neither party has appropriated a payment, the Clayton's rule applies as 
a presumption of fact to appropriate payment to the oldest debt. Where, however; the 
evidence shows that the parties never intended that mode of appropriation, the Clayton's 
rule will not apply and the substantive rule of law applies to appropriate the payment to 
the interest component first. If the public policy basis of the in duplum rule is borne in 
mind, it can easily be noted that there is nothing inherently inequitable about the Clayton's 
rule applying in favour of the debtor by reducing the capital amount even after the running 
of interest is suspended by the in duplum rule.22
The third aspect worth noting from Gillespie J's judgment and which directly raises the 
issue of public policy is whether or not the in duplum rule can be waived. In view of the 
public policy basis of the rule, the court had no difficulty in correctly holding that the rule 
cannot be waived by the agreement of the parties. This position has been recently endorsed 
by the courts in South Africa.23 The problem, however, is Gillespie J's suggestion that 
despite the invalidity of waiver of the rule, parties may, once the debt is called up, agree to 
a novation of the debt so that the new debt (made up of the combined capital and interest) 
can once again start accruing interest.24 256This'position was recently accepted in Aguy Clement 
Georgias & Anor v Standard Chartered Finance Zimbabwe Limited.15
It is submitted that there is no basis for such an artificial arrangement which will effectively 
undermine the rule. Creditors will naturally seek to have the debt novated once the rule 
affects the accruing of further interest. The moment the debtor requires the most protection 
of the law is when the debt is called up and there is harassment from the creditor. Taking 
away that protection at a time when it is needed most is inconsistent with the avowed 
public policy goal of the rule of protecting debtors from exploitation. Gillespie J. cited no 
authority for this exception and the South African cases already referred to create no such 
exception. The suggested exception should therefore be rejected as having no foundation 
either on authority or in policy. ~
UNDUE INFLUENCE AND SURETIES
Recent developments in English banking law in relation to a wife acting as a surety for her 
husbafid's individual or business bank borrowing raise questions as to the extent of public 
policy dictates in this area. In Barclays Bank v O'Brien16 it was held by the House of Lords 
that where a wife has been induced to enter into a suretyship contract guaranfeeing the 
debt of a company in which her husband has business interests by the misrepresentation 
or undue influence of the husband, she has an equity against the latter to set aside the 
transaction. This equity is enforceable against the bank (the creditor) either (i) where the 
husband acts as the bank's agent or (ii) where the bank has actual or constructive notice of 
the facts giving rise to the equity. The bank would be struck with constructive notice where 
it fails to take reasonable steps to satisfy itself that the wife's agreement was properly 
obtained provided the transaction is prima facie not to the advantage of the wife and there 
is a substantial risk of the husband having committed a legal or equitable wrong.
22 Contrast the position of Selikowitz J. who, while applying the Clayton's rule nevertheless made it 
inapplicable where the in duplum rule suspended the further running of interest: see p.576 D-E.
23 See Leech & Ors v ABSA Bank Ltd [199713 ALL SA 308(W); Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Oneanatc (In 
Liquidation) 1998 (I) SA 811 (SCA) at 828D-E.
24 At 466D.
25 HH-59-98.
26 [1994] 1 AC 180; [ 1993]4 ALL ER 417.
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Although the House of Lords rejected the Court of Appeal's thesis that wives were a 
"protected class" there can be little doubt that Barclays Bank v O'Brien is premised on-the 
need to protect persons in vulnerable relationships, with wives being identified as the 
foremost candidates for the protection. Indeed, the majority of the post-O'Brien cases have 
involved wives.27 The result is that whenever a wife is involved, the question is whether 
the advantage is to the wife. If it is, a second question arises: Is there a substantial risk that 
the husband has committed a legal or equitable wrong? If there is, the bank is obliged to 
take reasonable steps to avoid being struck with constructive notice. It appears that banks 
now invariably take reasonable steps whenever a wife is involved as a surety.28
Reasonable steps have been identified as explaining the nature and risks of the transaction 
to the wife in the absence of the husband and advising the wife to take independent legal 
advice.29
Although these principles are not exclusive to wives,30 it is clear that the courts have 
considered that the public policy of protecting vulnerable women from the undue influence 
of their husbands warrants extension to affect a third party (the bank) which is innocent of ~ 
the undue influence. The device of constructive notice, which essentially imposes a duty*1 
on the bank to ensure that.no undue influence has been exerted by a third party is clearly 
public policy at play. It goes beyond the logical principle that a party to a contract cannot 
be affected by the misrepresentation or undue influence of a third party unless it had 
knowledge of it or was the principal of the third party.
These developments in English law are relevant for Zimbabwean banking law in two 
possible ways. First, it is arguable, in view of section 89 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, 
that the law applicable at the Cape on 10 June 1891 in relation to undue influence was 
English law. Accordingly, the O'Brien principles, to the extent that they are a declaration of 
English law as it existed on 10 June 1891, can be regarded as representing Zimbabwean 
law. Secondly, and in the alternative, it is submitted that these developments are likely to 
inspire similar developments under Zimbabwean law. The likely direction from which 
this development will emanate is the concept of good faith in contract.31 Thus is the recent 
case of Eerste Nasionale Bank von Suidelike B p kv Saayman NO,32 Olivier JA, in a minority 
view, was prepared to use the bonafides principles toprotect an 85 year old woman from 
the consequences cft a suretyship contract which she had signed under the undue influence 
of her son. The old woman, who is described in the headnote as "hard of hearing and 
almost blind . . . and often confused and disoriented" was held by the majority to have
27 See for instance Bancor Exterior International vMann [199511ALLER93, TSB Bank p/c v Camfield [1995]1 
ALL ER 951; Bancor Exterior International v Thomas 1199711 ALL ER 46; Royal Bank of Scotland -pic v 
Etridge & Another [1997]3 ALL ER 628. For other cases, see Fehlberg, "The Husband, the Bank, the 
Wife and her Signature — The Sequel", [1996] MLR 675.
28 See Hooley, 'Taking Security After O'Brien" [1995] LMCLQ 346.
29 See Barclays Bank plcv O'Brien (supra) at 429-436, CIBC Mortgages pic v Pitt (1993) 4 ALL ER 433 at 441.
30 The principles have been applied to cohabitees (see O'Brien itself); to persons in an emotional or 
sexual relation short of cohabitation (Massey v Midland Bank pic [1995] 1 ALL ER 929; Banco Exterior 
International SAvThomas (1997) 1 ALLER46) and even to an employer-employee relationship (Credit 
Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Burch [1997J1 ALL ER 144).
31 For a instructive discussion of the place of good faith in contract, see generally Reinhard Zimmerman, 
"Good Faith and Equity" in Zimmmerman and Visser (eds), Southern Cross: Civil Law and Common 
Law in South Africa (1996.
32 1997(4) SA 302 (SCA).
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lacked contractual capacity. However, Olivier JA disagreed that she lacked contractual 
capacity but agreed to set aside the contract on a different ground. He held that she was 
saved by the principle of bonafides and said public policy, in the circumstances of the case, 
required a relaxation of the principle that a party to a contract was bound by the contents 
thereof. The headnote apply summarises Olivier JA's public policy intervention in the 
following words:
Where a surety was, as in the instant case, obviously physically weak and confused 
and possibly unable to understand fully the contents of the agreement, or where the 
surety was to the knowledge of the creditor, the debtor's spouse or elderly parent, 
public policy required that the creditor ensure that the surety understood the full 
import of the agreement and of any consequent cessions. This could be achieved by 
insisting that the surety obtain independent legal advice or by having the creditor 
explain to the surety the full implications oTthe agreement and any related document.
What happened in the instant case fell far short of these requirements. In the 
circumstances, the bona fides required that the surety agreement and cession not be 
enforced.33
This substantially covers the same area as the O'Brien principles. It is submitted that the 
public policy of protecting persons in vulnerable relationships from oppressive contractual 
provisions even where the other party is not responsible for inducing consent cannot be 
faulted. The law should not overlook unconscionable or manifestly disadvantageous 
transactions merely to promote freedom of contract. For this reason, it is likely that the 
principles in O'Brien will eventually be reflected in Zimbabwean law either through 
adoption on the basis o f  the law applicable at the Cape on 10 June 1891 or along the lines 
suggested by Olivier JA in the South African case just discussed. In that way, public policy 
will once again-shape another important area of banking law.
CONCLUSIVE PROOF CERTIFICATES
Conclusive proof certificates, which are a favourite tool of banks, have raised another avenue 
through which public policy has been invoked to resolve an issue in banking law. These 
certificates are a common feature of suretyship contracts and are typically in the following 
terms:1
The amount of the indebtedness of the debtor and the undersigned surety to the bank 
at any time shall be determined and proved by a certificate signed by any manager or 
accountant of the bank. Such certificate shall be binding and be conclusive proof of 
the amount of the indebtedness.
In the South African case of Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes34 a clause of this nature in a deed of 
cession was held to be void as being contrary to public policy. Subsequent to that decision, 
two conflicting cases emerged in the lower courts in South Africa as to what the decision 
was authority for. In Nedbank Ltd v Abstein Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others35 it was held 
that the Sasfin case stood for the proposition that in all cases, a clause of that nature in a 
contract was contrary to public policy and therefore void (the perse rule). This perse rule 
was rejected in Donelly v Barclays Bank National Bank Ltd which held that each case was to 
be considered bn its own merits. In the case, the bank was allowed to enforce the clause
33 At p. 304-305.
34 1989 (1) SA1(A).
35 1989(3) SA 750(T).
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given that it was a "recognized and reputable commercial bank of more than a century's 
standing in the country" and so the clause could not be regarded as contrary to public 
policy. As most banks can easily meet the description of being "recognized and reputable", 
the reasoning of the court effectively restricted Sasfin to the non-banking sector.
In Ex parte Minister o f Ju s t i c e th e  Appellate Division resolved the conflict between the two cases. 
It adopted the perse rule and held that any "conclusive proof certificate" which is signed by 
the creditor was contrary to public policy and therefore void. It firmly rejected any attempt 
to put banks in a separate class as being honest and of integrity and emphasised that as 
long as the certificate rested exclusively on signature by the bank, it was void, it being 
unconscionable to allow creditors to be judges in their own cause and exclude the 
jurisdiction of the courts.36 7
The court categorically rejected the approach of English law which has refused to hold 
such clauses to be contrary to public policy on the basis that bankers are "honest and 
reliable man of business who are most unlikely to make a mistake".38
Although the Zimbabwean Supreme court did not analyse the public policy issues of 
conclusive proof certificates, it adopted the per se rule in Karimazondo v Standard Chartered 
Bank of Zimbabwe.39 Be that as it may, it is submitted that the perse rule makes good law. Apart 
from the compelling reasoning in Ex parte Minister of Justice, the English justification for refusing 
to hold conclusive proof certificates as contrary to public policy, cannot be supported in 
the context of Zimbabwe. Given many new commercial banks, it is not in the public interest 
to adopt the view that bankers are "honest and reliable men of business who are unlikely 
to make a mistake."
DELICTUAL LIABILITY OF A COLLECTING BANKER TO THE TRUE OWNER OF A 
CHEQUE
The liability of a collecting bank to the true owner of a cheque which it has negligently 
collected on behalf of a customer who is noMhe trueowner is a matter in which public 
policy has played a decisive role. This arises from the nature of delictual liability under the 
actio leges Aquilia: negligence alone is not sufficient to ground liability, the action must also 
be wrongful in the sense that there is breach of a legal duty owed to the plaintiff. Whether 
or not there is a legal duty in any particular case depends on the dictates of public policy 
and it is for the courts to determine whether there are sufficient policy considerations to 
warrant the imposition of a legal duty.40
Traditionally, courts were unwilling to impose a legal duty where negligent conduct only 
led to 'pure economic loss'.41 Accordingly, since the negligent conduct of a bank in collecting
36 1995(3) SA 1 (AD).
37 At p. 21B-C.
38 See Bache and Co (London) Ltd v Banquet Venes at Commercial Paris SA [1973] 2 LiLR at p439-440.
39 1995(2) ZLR 404(S).
40 For a recent enunciation of the development of the wrongfulness requirement under the lex Aquilia, 
see Zimnat v Chazvanda.
41 See for instance Dickson and Co v Levy (1894) 11 SC 33; Union Government v National Bank of South 
Africa Ltd 1921 AD 121; Herschell v Mrupe 1954 (3) SA 464 (A); Union Government v Ocean Accident and 
Guarantee Corporation Ltd 1956(1) SA 577 (A); Combrink Chiro praktiese Klinkiek (Edms) Bpk v Datsun 
Motor Vehicle Distributors (Pty) Ltd 1972 (4) SA 185(T). The exception during this period was Perlman 
v Zoutendyk 1934 CPD 151, which was described by McKerron as "the leading heresy in the law of 
delict": [see (1973) 90SALJ1].
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a cheque on behalf of a non-owner only causes pure economic loss to the true owner, the 
liability of the collecting bank thus faced this unwillingness of the courts to create a legal 
duty. Up to 1992, Zimbabwean and South African banking laws had been developing in 
different directions, owing to differing views on what public policy required in this area of 
the law.
Zimbabwe took the lead in imposing a legal duty on the collecting bank not to negligently 
cause loss to the true owner of a cheque. Thus in Rhostar (Pvt) Ltd v Netherlands Bank of 
Rhodesia Ltd42 the then High Court of Rhodesia accepted the existence of a legal duty in the 
circumstances notwithstanding the loss being purely economic. This was immediately 
followed in Philsam Investments (Pvt) Ltd v Beverley Building Society.42 3 The main public policy 
consideration advanced by these Rhodesian cases was that the collecting teank£I_Slias-the 
on ly  one in a position to know whether or not the chequeAvas being collected on behalf of 
the true owner44 45and it was therefore fair and just that a legal duty be imposed. The Supreme 
Court ofZimbabwe had to seal this position in Zimbabwe Banking Corporation Ltd v Pyramid 
Motor Corporation45 given the then continuing refusal by the South African courts to follow 
suit. The court had to reconsider the public policy implications of imposing a legal duty. It 
had been argued that imposing liability on a collecting bank was detrimental to the speed 
and cost of the collection process.46 The Supreme Court was not persuaded by this reasoning 
and maintained that the imposing of a legal duty would not cause havoc in the commercial 
and financial world given that:
Since February 1972 when the decision in the Rhostar case was given, banks in this country 
have assumed that duty of care and the consequences flowing from it, and no doubt 
have ordered their affairs, procedures and techniques accordingly. The need to display 
vigilance has become a fact of their daily lives and there is no basis upon which to 
suppose that they are unable to cope with it.47
Further, "considerations of justice and convenience"48 supported the imposition of the legal 
duty. It is therefore clear that the justification for this position of the law is public policy.49
Interestingly, it was precisely on the basis of public policy that the South African courts 
initially refused to impose a legal duty on the collecting bank.50 The main arguments were 
that Imposing a legal duty would unnecessarily increase the costs and burden of the 
collection process51 and that it was undesirable for the courts to interfere with the law 
which has been laid down over a long period of time.52 It was also argued that the duty
42 1972(2) SA 70 (R).
43 1977(2) SA 546 (R).
44 See Goldin J in Rhostar at 715.
45 1985 (1) ZLR 358 (SC).
46 See for instance Cowen 1981 TSAR 195 at 220.
47 Per Gubbay JA at p.378F. #
48 At p 379.
49 See also Bank of Credit and Commerce Zimbabwe Ltd v Udc Ltd 1990(2) ZLR 397(SC); Biddulphs Removals 
& Storage v Standard Chartered Bank Zimbabwe Ltd & Anor 1996 (2) ZLR 206 (H)..
50 There has been extensive academic comment on the subject in South Africa. For a sample, see the 
articles cited in Malan & Pretorius, Malan on Bills of Exchange, Cheques and Promissory Notes (3rd edition) 
p.429, note 20.
51 Cowen, op. cit note 33. See also Worcester Advice Office v First National Bank of SA Ltd. 1990 (4) SA811 
(C) at 819.
52 See C. Hugo, " Negotiable Instruments" in Zimmerman & Visser (ed) Southern Cross: Civil Law and 
Common Law in South Africa (1996) p.481 at p.514.
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would operate unfairly towards banks.53 The first South African case to reject the duty of 
the collecting bank was Yorkshire Insurance Co Ltd v Standard Bank o f SA Ltd.54 This was 
followed some fifty yejirs latter in Atkinson Oates Motors Ltd v Trust Bank of Africa Ltd.55 56
Despite the acceptance of the principle of delictual liability for pure economic loss in 
Adminstrateur Natal v Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk56 subsequent South African cases continued 
to hold that public policy did not require the imposition of the legal duty.57 58Finally, however, 
in Indac Electronics (Pty) Ltd v Volkskas Bank Ltd58 the South African Appellate Division 
refused to be persuaded by the public policy arguments hitherto used to deny the existence 
of a legal duty and thundered:
There can be no reason in principle why a collecting banker should not be held liable 
under the extended lex Aquilia from negligence to a true owner of a cheque, provided 
all the elements or requirements of Aquilian liability have been met.59
This represented a changed conception of public policy in this area as the court considered 
that there was no spectre of indeterminate liability as potential claimants were easily 
identifiable. Thus the bank was not being exposed to limitless liability. Furthfii^smceihe 
bank professes to have special skills and competence jn  its professional calling> it was only 
fair thaTacTuty be imposed to avoid loss to the true owner of a  cheque.60 This new South 
African position has been followed in subsequent cases.61
The contrasting developments in Zimbabwe and South Africa and later the changed South 
African position on this issue, show the extent to which public policy can be used to influence 
the development of banking law in either way. Ultimately, it is the court's perception of 
what is fair, convenient and desirable, which determines the direction of the law.
CONCLUSION
The four areas discussed in this article have shown that public policy plays a central role in 
shaping the development of banking law. However, it is also clear that given its vague 
nature the extent of its influence largely depends on the attitudes of the judges. The result 
is that it can thus be resorted to in support of contrasting positions of the law. It has been 
shown, for instancy that public policy has been used to hold conclusive proof certificates 
null and void in South Africa and Zimbabwe, while English law has used the same public 
policy to make the certificates perfectly valid. It has also been seen that the differences 
which used to exist between Zimbabwean and South African law over the delictual liability 
of a collecting banker were each justified on the basis of public policy. Be that as it may, 
public policy is a useful device in banking law, both to protect the weaker party and to 
create a fair and convenient financial market.
53 See Worcester Advice Office v First National Bank of SA Ltd (supra) at 8201.
54 1928 WLD 251.
55 1977 (3) SA 188(W).
56 1979 (3) SA 824(A).
57 See Worcester Advice Office v First National Bank of SA Ltd 1990 (4) SA811 (C); Bonitas Medical Aid Fund 
v Volkskas Bank Ltd 1991 (2) SA231 (W).
58 1992(1) SA 783(A).
59 At p. 796C.
60 At p. 799B-E.
61 See Kwa Mashu Bakery Ltd v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 1995(1) SA 377 (D); Fedgen Insurance Ltd 
v Bankorp Ltd 1994 (2)SA399(W); First National Bank of SA Ltd v Quality Tyres (1970) (Pty) Ltd 1995 (3) 
SA 556 (A).
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